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FAITH APPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF EXISTING 
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW. 
••-- cutset, the State argues tnaL ^i.t]his Cour t should 
a*--". • • -.-^^ : j^ ijc-..; ., appellate argument because it is 
inadequately briefed," See State's Brief of Appellee,, . Illrih 
•iP|.-i.,iL(.; •. iw^cdure 2 4 , a M 9 ^ provides, in relevant p-tit, 
that ,![tjn^ ^rgumenL [set foiih JLH a Brir-C1 
contentions and reasons of the appellant v/] t t respect to 'he 
issues presented, including ':' 
not preserved in the tr:^L court, v;i* { •' ; tat ions * r _he 
authorities, statu*-- • <. • • - re, j.ej ._,-: . 
Based on a plain ana simple reading of Lne aforementioned 
mli-, Mi i'(ii'Vf-M . i ' ui tjiiint 'in "• on appeal pass muster of the 
inadequate-brief ing standard specifically set forth in that •- . 
Fi rst t .. . Attj ul Mr. Corvera are abundantly supportea oy 
various citations to authorities that include IIOL 
Lo.-^b !J . . .,L-_., States Supreme Court but those of * :icr * u 
Supreme Court: See Brief of Appellant; pp •. 
Corvera's B u e f of Appellant r,<v o:.V: .includes numerous citations 
to > he record on arv---.] i :. uddenduias thdt 
include date-stamped documents from the record on appeal, 
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including the trial court's one-page Order denying the subject 
Motion for a New Trial. See id. at pp. 4-6, Addendums A, B, & C. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the legal authority cited 
by Mr. Corvera in the Brief of Appellant is both relevant and 
applicable to the instant case. Moreover, this case, contrary 
again to the State's claim, involves a deliberate procedure and 
practice by the trial court to move forward with the interpreter 
even after the foreperson, in the midst of trial, alerted the 
trial court to translation problems dealing with the word "knife." 
See R. 148:3-9. 
II. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION, THE COURT 
FAILED TO UTILIZE THE CORRECT STANDARD IN THE 
COURSE OF REVIEWING AND DENYING MR. CORVERA'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The State argues that Mr. Corvera "bore the burden below of 
establishing his claim that he was denied a fair trial." See 
State's Brief of Appellee, p. 13. This is not at issue in the 
instant appeal. See State v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P. 2d 547, 
551 (1947); accord State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) . 
Notwithstanding the State's argument concerning a sufficiency 
of the evidence, the issue in the instant appeal is the standard 
utilized by the trial court in the course of reviewing and denying 
Mr. Corvera's Motion for a New Trial. While there is a certain 
2 
amount of discretion imparted to the trial court's review of a 
Motion for a New Trial, the trial court must apply the appropriate 
standard in the course of doing so. See State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 
99, f31, 37 P.3d 1073. To ensure that the appropriate standard is 
utilized by the trial court, the appellate court "review[s] the 
legal standards applied by the trial court in denying such a 
motion for correctness." Id. This means that no deference is 
given to the trial court's determination of the standard to be 
utilized in denying a motion for a new trial. Id. Moreover, 
especially close judicial scrutiny is applied to a review of the 
trial court's decision if the trial court's decision implicates a 
fundamental constitutional right. See State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 
2, fl5, 40 P.3d 611 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 
503, 96 S.Ct. 1691 (1976)). 
This case involves the fundamental constitutional right to a 
fair trial, which is guaranteed by both the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Holbrook 
v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1345 (1986); Estelle 
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1692 (1976). While 
the presumption of innocence is not specifically articulated in 
the Constitution, it is a basic component of the right to a fair 
trial under our system of justice. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503; 96 
S.Ct. at 1692. The United States Supreme Court long ago addressed 
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this by stating: "The principle that there is a presumption of 
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic 
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 
U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 403 (1895).x 
"To implement the presumption [of innocence], courts must be 
alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-
finding process." Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503; 96 S.Ct. at 1693. 
nIn the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully 
guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be 
established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt." 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 (1970). 
In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court further noted 
that n[t]he actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment 
of jurors cannot always be fully determined. But this Court has 
left no doubt that the probability of deleterious effects on 
fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny." Estelle, 
425 U.S. at 504; 96 S.Ct. at 1693 (citing Bstes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
532, 85 S.Ct. 1628 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 
lffCentral to the right to a fair trial . . .is the principle that 
'one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence 
determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, 
and not on grounds of . . . other circumstances not adduced as proof 
at trial.'" See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567, 106 S.Ct. at 1345 
(quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485, 98 S.Ct. 1930 
(1978)); 
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623 (1955)); see also State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ffl5, 19, 40 
P.3d 611. 
In the instant case, during her testimony through an 
interpreter the first day of trial, Mr. Corvera's spouse 
acknowledged that he had waived around, in a threatening manner, 
what appeared to be either a knife or the sheath of a knife. See 
R. 147:169:7-21. In addition, Officer Phillip Rogish, the lead 
investigator, testified that Mr. Corvera's spouse, through an 
interpreter, informed him that Mr. Corvera had waived a knife at 
her and threatened her shortly after the alleged incident of 
sexual abuse. See id. at R. 147:176-77. 
At the beginning of the second day of trial, the Bailiff 
informed the trial court that one of the jurors had requested an 
audience with the court. See id. at R. 148:3:8-13. Appearing 
alone before the trial court and counsel, the juror informed the 
trial court that, according to his knowledge of the Spanish 
language, the translator during the first day of trial had 
difficulty communicating the concept of "pocket knife" to Mr. 
Corvera's spouse. See id. at R. 148:6-8. The trial court told 
the juror "not to bring it up, you know, to the others" and to 
rely on the record for interpretation purposes. See id. at R. 
148:8:19-22. After the juror had left the courtroom, the trial 
court failed to require the court reporter to record the Spanish 
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words for "knife" referenced by the juror. See id. at R. 148:9:2-
6. 
During the second day of trial, Mr. Corvera also testified 
through an interpreter. See id. at R. 148:69:4-5. Through that 
interpreter, Mr. Corvera unequivocally denied both the charge and 
the underlying allegations supporting the charge. See id. at R. 
14 8:101-02. The jury subsequently convicted Mr. Corvera as 
charged. See id. at R. 148:181:15-19. 
Following the trial, appointed trial counsel, together with 
the prosecutor, spoke with seven or eight of the jurors. See id. 
at R. 102. During that discussion, the jury foreperson indicated 
that the verdict "had boiled down to the victim's word versus the 
defendant's word . . . ." See id. at R. 103. The foreperson 
stated further that while he was able to understand Mr. Corvera's 
testimony, because he speaks Spanish, many of the other jurors 
mentioned during deliberations that they had been unable to hear 
the interpreter when she spoke on behalf of Mr. Corvera during his 
testimony. See id. at R. 103. As a result, they "missed half of 
it . . . ." See id. at R. 103. 
Thereafter, Mr. Corvera's appointed trial counsel filed a 
Motion for New Trial accompanied by the Affidavit of appointed 
trial counsel. See id. at R. 100; R. 101-04. About ten months 
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later, the State filed an opposition to the Motion for a New 
Trial. 
After argument, the trial court summarily denied the Motion. 
See id. at R. 124. The trial court issued an Order denying the 
Motion, stating one, that "[t]here was insufficient evidence or 
information to find that the defendant's right to a fair trial was 
prejudiced in any way in relation to the translation or 
translators in this case", and two, that " [s]pecifically, there is 
no evidence that the jury was prejudiced in any way in relation to 
the translation of the word knife or in relation to the speaking 
volume of the translators." See id. at R. 125-26. 
The trial court failed to apply the requisite close judicial 
scrutiny to the alleged violation of Mr. Corvera's right to a fair 
trial. Instead, the trial court merely concluded that there was 
''insufficient evidence or information to find that the defendant's 
right to a fair trial was prejudiced . . . ." See id. at R. 125. 
In fact, the trial court concluded that there was no evidence of 
prejudice. See id.. 
Based at least, in part, on the Affidavit of Mr. Corvera's 
own appointed trial counsel, the presentation of the evidence 
during the Defendant's trial in-chief was at least significantly 
hampered, if not prejudiced, by the interpreter's failure to 
effectively communicate testimony of Mr. Corvera, as the accused, 
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as well as that of his wife, to the jurors during the course of 
trial. By failing to effectively communicate critical defense 
testimony to the jury, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Corvera's 
trial essentially constituted the lack of an interpreter, which 
resulted in Mr. Corvera's guilt being determined almost 
exclusively pursuant to the victim's testimony. Cf. State v. 
Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903, 906 (1942) (holding that it 
is better, in a questionable case, to err on the side of providing 
an interpreter -- reversible error when defendant's presentation 
thereby hampered). 
Not only did the interpreter's failure to effectively 
communicate with the jury constitute an inherently prejudicial 
courtroom action or arrangement to the detriment of Mr. Corvera, 
it also constituted an unacceptable risk that impermissibly eroded 
the presumption of innocence to which Mr. Corvera was entitled at 
trial. See Daniels, 2002 UT 2 at 1f20 (citing State v. Harrison, 
2001 UT 33, %6, 24 P.3d 939 (internal citations omitted)). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Corvera respectfully requests 
that this Court grant his Petition for Rehearing and reverse his 
conviction, remanding the case to the district court for further 
8 
proceedings consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth 
in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of December, 2005. 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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